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This paper is published as part of the project “From Here to EU: How to 
Talk about Migration in Africa? An Awareness Campaign for European 
Policymakers.” The one-year project is led by the Migration Program of 
the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP) and funded by 
Stiftung Mercator.
GOALS 
This project aims to inform German and European policymakers about 
migration debates and policies in select African countries to inform their 
present and future communication with representatives from that conti-
nent. The results aim to inform the European Union-African Union summit 
planned for 2021. 
Its research provides insights on migration policies and their framing in five 
significant countries of origin, transit, and destination of migrants in Afri-
ca: Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Tunisia, and South Africa. Drawing lessons from 
these national contexts, the project develops policy recommendations for 
German and European politicians, policy experts, and practitioners to fos-
ter a more constructive debate about future African-European cooperation 
on migration. 
OUTPUTS 
1. Two closed-door expert conferences under the Chatham House  
Rule that brought together policymakers and experts from Brussels  
and Berlin with African country experts in the fall of 2020 
2. Four country case studies, authored by African country experts 
on migration policies and practices in Egypt, Ghana, Tunisia, and 
South Africa
3. One summary analysis, authored by DGAP experts, that distills the  
main lessons from the country case studies and the Chatham House 
discussions
4. One public online event to present the main findings of the project and 
link it to other initiatives in the growing field of migration cooperation 
between Europe and Africa
Preface
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Key Recommendations
Despite a seemingly close partnership between Europe and Ghana on 
migration, their relations are full of pitfalls. Ghana’s interests in the 
diaspora, labor migration, and regional free movement are often at 
odds with Europeans’ focus on irregular migration and return policies.
 – German and European policymakers should scale 
up employment-based legal migration channels – 
as proposed in the EU’s New Pact on Migration and 
Asylum and Germany’s Skilled Migration Act – to 
enable circular and seasonal migration. The win-win 
concept of circular migration should finally become 
a workable reality.
 – German and European policymakers should incen-
tivize a lowering of the high costs of intra-African 
remittances. With lower transfer fees, migrants may 
take greater interest in using formal channels, which 
would, in turn, ensure that remittances effectively 
contribute to the fiscus. With close to half of all its 
emigrants in the ECOWAS region, Ghana is likely to 
support policy changes at the ECOWAS level that 
could result in higher remittances.
 – German and European policymakers should adopt 
a new narrative to speak about migration in the 
ECOWAS region. Instead of focusing on migration 
control, they should focus on regional free move-
ment. They should invite policymakers in the region 
to decrease protectionist policies that continue to 
hinder Ghana and other ECOWAS countries from 
reaping the benefits of regional free movement. 
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1. INTRODUCTION
Since its 2015 migration crisis, the European Union (EU) has 
increasingly focused its migration policies beyond its bor-
ders, deepening its cooperation with third countries, ma-
ny of them in Africa. Ghana is one of these countries. While 
it is not a primary country of origin of migrants in the 
post-Brexit EU, the West African nation is an important Eu-
ropean partner in the region.1 After Nigeria, Ghana boasts 
the second strongest economy2 of the fifteen members of 
the Economic Community of West African States (ECOW-
AS),3 resulting in important migration flows from and to the 
rest of the region. The country also displays traits that are 
common across the ECOWAS region, including a strong fo-
cus on the diaspora and emigration, as well as a comparative 
reluctance to formalize immigration opportunities for citi-
zens of other West African countries. The Ghanaian case is, 
therefore, indicative of both migration policy within ECOW-
AS – which is building up its own free movement regime – 
and the EU’s relations with other ECOWAS members.  
As relations between the EU and ECOWAS countries have 
deepened, they have become stretched and sometimes 
marred by conflicting political and policy orientations. The 
EU’s migration relationship to Ghana is a case in point. Al-
though the EU invests in the ECOWAS regional free move-
ment regime, seeing benefits in helping West African 
migrants find local opportunities, it, in practice, focuses 
most heavily on bilateral relations to individual ECOWAS 
states. In these bilateral relations, the EU and its member 
states tend to emphasize the return of unsuccessful asylum 
seekers, control of Europe’s borders, disruption of tran-
sit routes for irregular migrants, and – most damaging to 
the progress of the ECOWAS free movement regime – ways 
to keep would-be migrants from leaving their home coun-
tries. To further these migration objectives, European gov-
ernments rely on various tools, primarily the EU Emergency 
Trust Fund for Africa, their development agencies, and in-
ternational organizations such as the International Organi-
zation for Migration (IOM). 
Ghana’s main migration interests are different from the 
EU’s. There, migration is generally perceived as a less sa-
lient policy issue, with other policy areas – for example, 
economic growth, health, poverty reduction, food security, 
and education – taking a front seat. Indeed, economic and 
1  Ghana is, for instance, a beneficiary of the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa and a priority country of the German Marshall Plan for Africa.   
2  World Bank Data, GDP (Current US$) 2019:  
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?locations=GH-NG-SN-TG-GM-GN-CV-BJ-BF-ML-NE-CI-GW-LR-SL&most_recent_value_desc=true  
(accessed January 14, 2021). 
3  Member states of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) are Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana,  
Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo. 
development considerations heavily influence, if not dic-
tate, migration policies. High on the Ghanaian government’s 
priority list are, therefore, forms of migration that contrib-
ute to the country’s economic development, such as the en-
gagement of its sizable diaspora (which Ghana defines as 
including not only nationals abroad but also descendants of 
African slaves, see box on p.  13). It prioritizes securing safe 
and legal pathways to work abroad for Ghanaians, including 
low and unskilled workers. Because Ghana mainly attracts 
and contributes to migration within ECOWAS, its focus is 
squarely on regional migration. Its reluctance to formalize 
opportunities for immigrants from the region is, however, 
typical and plagues the ECOWAS system. 
This paper analyzes the Euro-Ghanaian partnership on 
 migration and answers three main questions:
• What has been the impact of European engagement on 
migration governance in Ghana?
• Which policy issues dominate the debate on migration 
in Ghana and with its European partners?
• What should European policymakers know to be  
better prepared for future migration talks with their 
Ghanaian counterparts?  
The first part of the paper gives an overview of the relevant 
actors in migration governance in Ghana. It focuses on the 
formulation and aftermath of its 2016 National Migration Pol-
icy (NMP), the country’s first attempt to create a compre-
hensive policy framework for migration and to harmonize a 
myriad of migration-related laws and regulations. Although 
the EU supported the NMP – a central piece of Ghana’s mi-
gration policy – it remains widely unimplemented. The sec-
ond part of the paper investigates the partnership of Ghana 
and the EU on migration and focuses on the five priority ar-
eas that define that relationship. The third part offers six 
concrete policy recommendations to German and European 
politicians, policy experts, and practitioners to foster informed 
discussions on migration with their Ghanaian counterparts. 
This paper is based on desk-based research, interviews 
conducted with Ghanaian officials between May and Sep-
tember 2020 (see List of Interviews Conducted in the an-
nex), and discussions in the framework of the DGAP project 
“From Here to EU – How to Talk about Migration in Africa?” 
(see preface for more information).
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2.  HOW EUROPEAN FUNDS HAVE 
COME TO SHAPE MIGRATION 
POLICYMAKING IN GHANA
2.1  Migration Governance in Ghana: A Competitive Field  
Ghana’s migration policymaking hinges on a multitude of 
actors, including many government ministries and agen-
cies, regional bodies, international organizations, and inter-
national donors. 
Three government ministries play a leading role in Ghana’s 
migration governance. The first is the Ministry of Interi-
or (MOI), which primarily formulates immigration policies 
and hosts the Ghana Immigration Service and the Migra-
tion Unit. It also played a significant role in the develop-
ment of Ghana’s 2016 National Migration Policy (NMP), the 
framework document that is supposed to expand Ghana’s 
migration policy development from emigration to immi-
gration. (In practice, however, the NMP focuses strongly 
on the former at the expense of the latter.) In addition, the 
Inter-Ministerial Steering Committee on Migration, which 
coordinates migration-related issues among government 
ministries, reports to the MOI. 
The second key ministry is the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
and Regional Integration (MFARI). It leads the cooperation 
with partner countries and international organizations on 
 
FIG. 1: MIGRATION GOVERNANCE IN GHANA: A COMPETITIVE FIELD
Source: Author’s compilation 
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returns and diaspora affairs – although, even on these core 
issues, its authority is not absolute. For instance, the cre-
ation of the Diaspora Affairs Unit at the MFARI in 2012 was 
meant to help finalize a Diaspora Engagement Policy (DEP). 
In 2017, however, Ghanaian President Nana Akufo-Addo 
transferred responsibility for the DEP to the newly created 
Diaspora Affairs Office at the Office of the President, which 
led to a high level of prioritization – and politicization – of 
diaspora policy. It also weakened the place of diaspora af-
fairs in the MFARI and in Ghana’s institutional structure. 
Ahead of the general elections of December 2020, the Of-
fice of the President worked in vain to launch the DEP.4 
Lastly, the Ministry of Employment and Labor Relations 
is responsible for labor migration. It has been actively in-
volved in the development of the National Labor Migration 
Policy (NLMP), which was supported by IOM, funded by the 
EU, and launched in 2018. Complementing the NMP, the 
document specifically promotes the governance of labor 
migration from and to Ghana and the protection of Gha-
naian emigrants and immigrants to Ghana. It also provides 
guidelines on safe and regular migration for immigrants in 
Ghana and Ghanaians looking to move abroad.5 
Other relevant migration policy actors include ministries 
such as the Ministry of Gender; not to mention interna-
tional organizations, especially IOM and the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees; donor governments and 
their development arms, such as Germany’s GIZ or the 
4   Interview of a senior researcher in Accra on January 20, 2021.
5    Some argue that the NLMP provides the government grounds to ratify international treaties relating to labor migration and stiffen the penalization of private overseas 
employment agencies, often cited as responsible for the unethical treatment of migrants abroad. See: International Organization for Migration (IOM),  
“Ghana Labour Migration Policy Validated,” January 9, 2019: https://www.iom.int/news/ghana-labour-migration-policy-validated (accessed June 14, 2020).
6    Clare Castillejo, “The Influence of EU Migration Policy on Regional Free Movement in the IGAD and ECOWAS Regions,” German Development Institute (DIE), November 2019:  
https://www.die-gdi.de/en/discussion-paper/article/the-influence-of-eu-migration-policy-on-regional-free-movement-in-the-igad-and-ecowas-regions  
(accessed May 15, 2020).
7   Interview of a senior civil servant in Accra on August 31, 2020. 
8  Melissa Mouthaan “Unpacking domestic preferences in the policy-‘receiving’ state: the EU’s migration cooperation with Senegal and Ghana,” Comparative Migration 
UK’s DFID; and regional actors, especially ECOWAS and the 
African Union (AU). Academics have also played a large role 
in migration policy development in Ghana, specifically the 
Centre for Migration Studies at the University of Ghana in 
Accra. As for the EU, it has been trying to steer migration 
policy reforms not just in Ghana but across the continent, 
particularly in regions of origin such as Western Africa. 
These efforts have followed a dual rationale of reinforcing 
regional free movement on the one hand and reducing ir-
regular migration from the continent on the other.6
As in many other countries, the coordination of migration 
authorities in Ghana is difficult, and tensions between them 
abound. Conflict arose between the foreign and interior 
ministries over which institution was to lead the develop-
ment of the NMP. These tensions deepened when staff from 
the Ghana Immigration Service (GIS), which is part of the 
MOI, supported missions to Europe led by diplomats from 
the MFARI to identify Ghanaian migrants with a view to re-
patriating them.  Meanwhile, other ministries, including the 
Ministry of Gender, sought to gain access to the NMP policy 
process in view of benefiting from related funds. As one civ-
il servant put it, all ministries see themselves as legitimate 
actors of migration management.7 
This inter-ministerial competition is exacerbated by ex-
ternal involvement and funding. EU funding streams have 
brought some actors to the fore – such as the GIS and its 
host, the Ministry of Interior. The pair are perceived as “Eu-
rope’s darlings” due to the share of funds they receive.8 
EU funding streams have brought some actors to the fore, 
such as the Ministry of Interior and its Immigration  
Service, which are perceived as “Europe’s darlings” due  
to the share of funds they receive
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FOUNDING   
DOCUMENTS 
In part because of these tensions, migration policy in Ghana 
is heavily politicized – or more precisely, particular aspects 
of migration policy are. This means that policy development 
is long and tedious, as is implementation. Progress on migra-
tion governance frameworks has also been fragmentary. The 
National Labor Migration Policy (NLMP) was developed and 
adopted quickly – within a year – due to policymakers’ inter-
est in finding avenues of migration for Ghanaian workers. But 
the processes for adopting a Diaspora Engagement Policy 
(DEP) and the National Migration Policy (NMP) has dragged 
on for years, victims of the high political stakes surrounding 
diaspora policy (See Figure 2).
Studies, August 26, 2019, p. 7. The online version can be found here: https://comparativemigrationstudies.springeropen.com/articles/10.1186/s40878-019-0141-7 
(accessed March 16, 2021).  
9  Ministry of Interior, “National Migration Policy for Ghana,” April 2016, p. 57:  
https://www.mint.gov.gh/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/National_Migration_Policy_for_Ghana.pdf (accessed March 16, 2021). 
2.2  National Migration Policy: Big Plans,  
Little Implementation
The NMP is the central pillar of Ghanaian migration poli-
cy development and can be called a “do-it-all document.” It 
addresses all areas of migration, including internal migra-
tion, irregular migration, urbanization, human trafficking, 
labor migration, border management, diaspora engage-
ment, forced displacement, citizenship, climate change, 
and migration data management. The NMP also looks at 
cross-cutting issues such as gender, health, education, vul-
nerable groups, tourism and cultural heritage, trade and 
services, and natural resources.9
FIG. 2:  A SHORT HISTORY OF GHANA’S CURRENT MIGRATION POLICY FRAMEWORK
Source: Author’s compilation 
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But today, more than four years after its launch, the NMP 
has yet to be fully implemented. The institutional structure 
meant to implement the policy – the proposed Ghana Na-
tional Migration Commission – is yet to be established.10 The 
delay in implementation can be explained by two main fac-
tors. First, the NMP finds itself entangled in party politics. 
The fact that new governments pursue different policy ini-
tiatives and shelve policies from previous administrations 
is a significant challenge for Ghana. For instance, the gov-
ernment led by the National Democratic Congress, which 
launched the NMP in 2016, lost power to the opposition 
New Patriotic Party (NPP) that same year. The NPP’s limit-
ed involvement in the development of that policy may ex-
plain why Ghana’s current government distanced itself from 
the NMP and has expressed the desire to revisit it since it 
assumed power in 2017.11 Also, the over-engagement of pol-
iticians in power, in particular in fields such as diaspora en-
gagement, comes at the expense of civil servants and other 
non-governmental actors; such engagement, thus, rep-
resents a challenge to the sustainability of policy once poli-
ticians are voted out
Second, Ghanaian actors lack ownership over the NMP. Ex-
ternal actors have played an outsize role not only in the 
drafting of the NMP, but also in some aspects of its imple-
mentation. It was thanks to funds from the EU and techni-
cal oversight by IOM that the project of an NMP was first 
picked up in 2012 and finalized in 2016.12 While Ghanaian of-
ficials welcome EU-funded IOM initiatives in principle, they 
deplore the way Ghanaian institutions have been circum-
vented in their implementation – from the design of con-
sultation processes to the employment of international staff 
to steer the work.13 Critics point out that the NMP was basi-
cally co-drafted by international and European actors active 
in Ghana. Tellingly, the Ministry of Interior, the domes-
tic custodian of the policy, outsourced the drafting process 
to consultants from the Centre for Migration Studies at the 
University of Ghana, under the steering and technical over-
sight of IOM.14 This lack of ownership is a common feature 
10   In 2019, the Ministry of Interior, with the support of IOM, set up an inter-ministerial working group tasked with establishing the Ghana National Migration Commission.  
In 2020, IOM facilitated the visits of the inter-ministerial working group to Kenya and Nigeria so it could study the migration commissions in these countries.
11  Melissa Mouthaan, “Unpacking domestic preferences in the policy-‘receiving’ state” (see note 8).
12   Nadine Segadlo, “Navigating Through an External Agenda and Internal Preferences: Ghana’s National Migration Policy,” German Development Institute (DIE), 2021:  
https://www.die-gdi.de/discussion-paper/article/navigating-through-an-external-agenda-and-internal-preferences-ghanas-national-migration-policy  
(accessed March 8, 2021). 
13  Interview of a senior civil servant in Accra on August 30, 2020. 
14  Interview of a senior civil servant in Accra on August 31, 2020.  
15   Florian Trauner, Leonie Jegen, Ilke Adam, and Christof Roos, “The International Organization for Migration in West Africa: Why Its Role Is Getting More Contested,”  
UNU-CRIS Policy Brief No. 03, 2019: http://cris.unu.edu/sites/cris.unu.edu/files/PB-2019-3.pdf (accessed November 23, 2020).  
16   For instance, the Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy 2006–2009 (GPRS II) placed immigration and rural-urban migration under separate policy frameworks.  
While rural-urban migration related to urban infrastructure development, immigration was concentrated under public safety and security.
17   The GSGDA is a medium-term strategy among several policies and programs prepared by the Ghana National Planning Commission that aim to accelerate Ghana’s 
economic growth and improve living standards. 
18  Government of Ghana’s National Development Planning Commission, “Ghana’s Shared Growth and Development Agenda (GSGDA) II (2010–2013), Volume I: Policy 
Framework,” September 7, 2010, p. 145: https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/delegations/ghana/documents/eu_ghana/ghana_shared_growth_and_development_agenda_en.pdf 
(accessed November 23, 2020).  
that can be observed in other West African countries that 
are associated with the EU’s Migration Partnership Frame-
work, which was launched in 2016.15 
Despite these blockades, some parts of the NMP are being 
operationalized. So far, most concern projects that focus on 
border control and migration management – two policy fields 
that reflect the EU’s rather than Ghana’s priorities. Further-
more, this kind of partial operationalization runs against the 
core aim of the NMP, which was meant to be comprehensive. 
Well before the NMP’s launch in 2016 and even before the 
negotiations around it kicked off in 2012 (see Figure 2), Gha-
na itself had come around to the idea of ending its rath-
er fragmented approach to migration.16 The Ghana Shared 
Growth and Development Agenda II (GSGDA 2010–2013)17 
suggests synchronizing all of Ghana’s policies that are rele-
vant to migration into a single one under the header “man-
aging migration for national development.”18 However, the 
The fact that new  
governments pursue  
different policy initiatives 
and shelve policies from 
previous administrations  
is a significant challenge 
for Ghana
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GSGDA’s recommendations19 were not operationalized and 
suffered from an overall lack of budget and prioritization by 
the government. Ministries were left with the prerogative 
of implementing the GSGDA’s recommendations in order 
of relevance, meaning that migration fell well behind oth-
er priority issues. 
The NMP follows a whole-of-government approach that is, 
consequently, relatively new to Ghana.20 The policy is nov-
el because it requires substantial coordination and main-
streaming in a multitude of policy areas – an approach that 
was promoted by the AU and ECOWAS. Both the 2006 AU 
Migration Policy Framework for Africa and 2008 ECOW-
AS Common Approach on Migration explicitly encouraged 
member states to develop NMPs. The EU supported migra-
tion reform processes in Ghana, as it did elsewhere in the 
region. But despite the backing from international actors, 
Ghana’s technical and coordination capacities for imple-
mentation remain low. For the NMP to take proper effect, 
it needs, for example, to be streamlined into Ghana’s devel-
opment plan. But despite the fact that the Ghana National 
Development and Planning Commission is the government 
partner in charge of mainstreaming migration issues into 
development plans, this work was largely taken over by the 
IOM in 2018, when it set up a new inter-agency technical 
working group to implement and monitor the streamlin-
ing process.21 Given these layered challenges, it remains un-
clear whether the NMP’s implementation will proceed more 
smoothly in the future. 
3. CONTRASTING GHANAIAN 
AND EUROPEAN INTERESTS IN 
THE MIGRATION PARTNERSHIP
Three primary issues – all tied to Ghana’s economic health 
and domestic politics – top the country’s priority list: di-
aspora engagement, labor migration, and regional free 
movement within ECOWAS. European partners keep em-
phasizing that they are interested in these issues as well, 
for instance in the 2016 Joint Declaration on Ghana-EU Co-
19  Recommendations include: (1) formulating a national migration and development policy; (2) mainstreaming migration into national development frameworks;  
(3) establishing a national institution for the management of migration for development; and (4) establishing a database on Ghanaians abroad. 
20  The whole-of-government approach to policy implementation is relatively new to many African nations. The concept was first used by the administration of UK Prime 
Minister Tony Blair, which refered to it as Joined-Up Government (JG). See: BBC, “So what is joined-up government?”, November 23, 1998:  
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/special_report/1998/11/98/e-cyclopedia/211553.stm (accessed March 16, 2021). The approach requires various parts of government to work 
together to facilitate synergies, manage trade-offs, and avoid or minimize negative spill-overs. See Karina Cázarez-Grageda, “The whole of government approach: Initial 
lessons concerning national coordinating structures for the 2030 Agenda and how review can improve their operation,” Partners for Review Discussion Paper, March 2019: 
https://www.partners-for-review.de/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/Whole-of-Government-P4R-Discussion-paper-2019.pdf (accessed March 16, 2021). 
21  Under the two-year project on “Integrating Migration into National Development Plans: Toward Policy Coherence and the Achievement of Sustainable Development Goals  
at National and Global Levels.” See: IOM, “IOM Launches Project to Mainstream Migration-Related Goals into National Development Plans,” February 3, 2018:  
https://www.iom.int/news/iom-launches-project-mainstream-migration-related-goals-national-development-plans (accessed March 17, 2021). 
22   Government of the Netherlands, “Joint Declaration on Ghana-EU Cooperation on Migration,” April 16, 2016:  
https://www.government.nl/documents/publications/2016/04/16/joint-declaration-on-ghana-eu-cooperation-on-migration (accessed November 23, 2020).
operation on Migration.22 A lot of their practical attention 
and funds, however, tend to center on the two issues of ir-
regular migration and forced returns. Ghanaians and Euro-
peans seem to look in different directions when they talk 
about migration. Acknowledging this divergence may be a 
good step toward closing the gap.
3.1 Ghana’s Global Diaspora: A Coveted Asset  
Diaspora engagement trumps all other migration issues in 
Ghana. There are political, historical, and economic reasons 
for this preference.
First, Ghana’s emigrant population is sizable. As of 2017, 
an estimated 970,000 Ghanaians lived abroad – mainly in 
neighboring Nigeria, but also in the United States and the 
United Kingdom, with smaller shares in Côte d’Ivoire, Italy, 
and Germany (see Figure 3).
Emigration from Ghana began to slowly increase after 1957 
when the country became independent from British colo-
nial rule. In the 1960s, it mainly concerned students and 
skilled professionals from the ruling elite who mostly chose 
the United Kingdom and the United States as their destina-
tion. Others, in the spirit of Pan-Africanism championed by 
Ghana’s first president Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, emigrated to 
other African countries. International emigration from Gha-
na became significant during the 1970s and 1980s, a time of 
political instability and economic hardship within both the 
country and its sub-region. 
Second, the diaspora is seen as a source of economic and 
human capital. In 2019, personal remittances received in 
Ghana amounted to $3.5 billion, 5.4 percent of the year’s 
GDP. This is a thirty-fold increase compared to 2009, when 
the country received a mere $114 million (see Figure 4). The 
sharp increase in the amount of remittances received can 
be explained by the increasing use of formal channels for 
money transfers and improvements on the part of the Bank 
of Ghana to produce data on remittances. The government 
aims to capitalize on this development. In January 2020, 
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following the Year of Return,23 the Ministry of Finance an-
nounced the establishment of the African Sankofa Savings 
Account, a diaspora investment fund to provide investment 
opportunities for the diaspora community worldwide.24 
Ghana also sees diaspora engagement as a lever to attract 
skilled Ghanaian professionals from abroad to support the 
country’s development agenda. Brain drain is an ongo-
ing challenge. Estimates indicate that around 56 percent of 
doctors and 24 percent of nurses trained in Ghana are em-
ployed abroad, mainly in the United Kingdom and United 
States.25 Ghana’s educational sector is also challenged; an 
estimated average of 50 percent of faculty positions in pub-
lic and polytechnic universities are vacant.26 Consequent-
23  Ghana declared 2019 the Year of Return and hosted a year-long program of activities to commemorate the 400th anniversary of the arrival of the first recorded enslaved 
Africans in America. For more information about its implications, see page 13.
24   Ghanaian Ministry of Finance, “Minister for Finance announces the Establishment of African Sankofa Savings Account,” January 4, 2020:  
https://www.mofep.gov.gh/news-and-events/2020-01-04/minister-for-finance-announces-the-establishment-of-african-sankofa-savings-account  
(accessed August 20, 2020). 
25   Phyllis Asare, “Labour Migration in Ghana,” Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, October 2012, p. 6: https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/ghana/10511.pdf  
(accessed November 23, 2020).  
26   Alexandre Devillard, Alessia Bacchi, and Marion Noack, “A Survey on Migration Policies in West Africa,” International Centre for Migration Policy Development and the 
International Organization for Migration, March 2015, p. 158: https://publications.iom.int/fr/system/files/pdf/survey_west_africa_en.pdf (accessed June 2, 2020).
ly, bringing Ghana’s talents and highly skilled professionals 
home is an essential part of the mandate of the President’s 
Diaspora Affairs Office. 
Third, Ghanaian politics also relies heavily on the diaspora 
for financial contributions. Both of the country’s main polit-
ical parties – the New Patriotic Party (NPP) and the National 
Democratic Congress (NDC) – count on diaspora associa-
tions and party chapters abroad for funding. Notably, the 
Diaspora Affairs Office has a service dedicated to lobbying 
for the increased political participation of the Ghanaian di-
aspora. Ghanaian governments also recruit members of the 
diaspora for high-level positions, which is quite unusual 
compared to other countries where a long time abroad is 
Germany
28 k
FIG. 3:  WHERE ARE GHANAIANS ABROAD?
Source: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division,  
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FIG. 4:   PERSONAL REMITTANCES, RECEIVED FOR GHANA
Percent  
of GDP








more of a hindrance than a help in entering politics.27 Gha-
naians abroad are not, however, granted voting rights. The 
implementation of the 2006 Representation of the Peo-
ple Amendment Act sets out the organization of the over-
seas vote but remains unimplemented. In 2017, the Human 
Rights Division of the High Court in Accra ordered the Gha-
naian electoral commission to implement the Representa-
tion of the People Amendment Act for the 2020 presidential 
elections, a decision that gained traction in the context of 
27  Diaspora Affairs Office of the President, The Ghanaian Diaspora, October–December 2018, p. 55: 
https://diasporaaffairs.gov.gh/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Diasporamagazine_OctDec18.pdf (accessed November 23, 2020). 
28  Bob Koigi, “Majority of respondents want Ghanaians abroad allowed to register and vote, Election Poll,” Africa Business Communities, September 1, 2020:  
https://africabusinesscommunities.com/news/majority-of-respondents-want-ghanaians-abroad-allowed-to-register-and-vote-election-poll  
(accessed November 24, 2020). 
29  See notes from the Tracing Center: http://www.tracingcenter.org/resources/background/ghana-and-the-slave-trade  
 (accessed August 20, 2020).
30 See Ministry of Interior, “Right of Abode”: https://www.mint.gov.gh/services/right-of-abode (accessed January 26, 2020). 
the coronavirus crisis, which stranded many abroad.28 Ul-
timately, however, the electoral commission was unable to 
register Ghanaians abroad to vote in this election – and it 
cited the COVID-19 pandemic as a reason.
Last, Ghana’s colonial past plays a defining role in today’s 
conceptualization of the diaspora (see box). Ghana was the 
epicenter of the British slave trade. For almost 150 years, 
millions of Africans – mostly from Western and Central Af-
rica – were shipped to the Americas and Caribbean from 
Ghana.29 Against this background, the country’s Pan-Afri-
canist legacy has tinted the concept of diaspora with an 
ideological undertone. According to this narrative, Gha-
na has a moral responsibility for the emancipation of de-
scendants of the transatlantic slave trade. Therefore, the 
Ghanaian definition of diaspora embraces all African de-
scendants of the slave trade.30 
This narrative has policy implications. In 2002, under the 
Citizenship Act and Right to Abode, it became easier for 
people of African descent to obtain visas, residency permits, 
and citizenship rights. With the 2000 Ghana Citizen Act Du-
al Citizenship Scheme, Ghana amended its citizenship laws 
to allow dual citizenship. As a symbolic landmark, President 
Akufo-Addo declared 2019 the Year of Return to commemo-
rate the 400th anniversary of the arrival of African slaves to 
America. The year-long commemoration included spiritual 
What do you mean?
Why Ghana’s Definitions of Diaspora and Return 
Differ from the EU’s
Although Ghana uses migration terms that are 
similar to those used in Europe, they often have dif-
ferent meanings or connotations. Ghana’s definition 
of “diaspora,” for example, does not merely refer 
to Ghanaian nationals abroad. Instead, it includes 
all African descendants of the transatlantic slave 
trade. This wider definition is a legacy of the Pan-Af-
rican political affinity that grew in the aftermath 
of Ghana’s independence from British colonial rule. 
 
The politically loaded term “return” is also defined 
more broadly in Ghana than in Europe.  In Ghana, 
return means three things: the return of all African 
descendants of the slave trade, including those who 
might never have been to Ghana before; the voluntary 
return of Ghanaian nationals who have emigrated; 
and forced returns, including deportations from 
Europe or elsewhere. The first two meanings have 
positive connotations – as shown, for example, by 
Ghana’s prioritization of good diaspora relations. 
Ghanaian policymakers take pride in the country’s 
role of homeland to those Africans taken forcibly 
from their shores.
2000 2005 2010 2015 2020
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and birth-right rituals for the returnees.31 As part of this ini-
tiative, 126 descendants of slaves from the United States and 
the Caribbean were granted Ghanaian citizenship.32
3.2  The Challenge of Securing Safe Pathways  
for Unskilled Laborers
Although labor emigration is another important issue on 
Ghana’s migration agenda, the country struggles to secure 
safe pathways for its nationals, especially unskilled laborers, 
to work abroad.
While nearly half of Ghana’s emigrants are highly skilled – 
46 percent, the highest rate in West Africa33 – the other half 
of the country’s emigrants is low skilled or unskilled. Among 
them, an estimated 4,000 Ghanaians are officially em-
ployed in the Gulf States and Middle East (mainly Saudi Ara-
bia, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Kuwait, and Jordan); half 
of those are domestic workers.34 The abuse and exploita-
tion they often face is an issue of prime concern for both the 
government and general public. In order to prevent irregular 
migration to the Gulf and potential abuses, the government 
of Ghana had created a specific visa scheme, Visa-20, which 
31 For more on the 2019 Year of Return, see: https://www.yearofreturn.com (accessed June 8, 2020). 
32  Kwasi Gyamfi Asiedu, “Ghana granted citizenship to over 100 African Americans and Afro-Caribbeans as part of Year of Return,” Quartz Africa, November 28, 2019:  
https://qz.com/africa/1757853/ghana-gives-citizenship-to-100-african-americans-year-of-return (accessed January 4, 2020). Dual citizenship is also one of the focus 
points of the NMP under the migration for development agenda
33  Phyllis Asare, “Labour Migration in Ghana,” p. 6 (see note 25).   
34   Leander Kandilige, Joseph Teye, Mary Setrana, and Delali Margaret Badasu, “Ghanaian Domestic Workers in the Middle East, Summary Report,” IOM, September 2019, p. 5: 
https://www.iom.int/sites/default/files/country/docs/ghana//iom_ghana_domestic_workers_report_summary-finr.pdf (accessed November 23, 2020). 
35  Connection men are informal migration brokers operating outside of a legal framework.
36   “Is it time to lift ban on migration to Gulf States?”, Ghanaian Times, February 8, 2020:  
https://www.ghanaiantimes.com.gh/is-it-time-to-lift-ban-on-migration-to-gulf-states/ (accessed November 23, 2020).
37   Sub-Saharan migrants – a total of 666,717 people – represent close to 70 percent of migrants in Libya, i.e., the vast majority. IOM, “Libya’s Migrant Report, Round 24,” 
Displacement Tracking Matrix, January–February 2019: https://migration.iom.int/system/tdf/reports/R24%20migrant%20report.pdf?file=1&type=node&id=5516  
(accessed on August 20, 2020).  
38   EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa, “Over 1,000 Ghanaians Assisted to Return Home since 2017 under EU-IOM Joint Initiative on Migrant Protection and Reintegration,” 
February 4, 2019: https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/all-news-and-stories/over-1000-ghanaians-assisted-return-home-2017-under-eu-iom-joint-initiative_en 
(accessed November 23, 2020). 
was granted to labor migrants planning to travel to those 
states for domestic work. Although many do find employ-
ment and migrate through legitimate overseas employment 
agencies, registered travel agencies and so-called connec-
tion men35 are known to forge travel documents and pro-
vide misleading information about the nature and conditions 
of work, often putting laborers in abusive and exploitative 
situations. Faced with continuing reports on the deplorable 
situation of some laborers in the Gulf, Ghana’s Labor Min-
istry backtracked and, in 2017, banned the issuance of the 
Visa-20. Nonetheless, labor migration to the Gulf persists.36
Libya is another destination country for many Ghanaian la-
borers. In spite of the unstable situation and dangers they 
often face there, Ghanaians make up around 10 percent of 
all sub-Saharan African migrants in Libya.37 More than 1,000 
Ghanaian migrants who sought to escape hardship situ-
ations were returned between 2017 and 2019 under the 
EU-IOM Joint Initiative for Migrant Protection and Reinte-
gration (they were mainly from Libya, but also from Niger).38 
Yet many returnees are willing to make the journey again. 
Far from being a springboard for irregular migration across 
As demonstrated by the government’s push for a  
labor migration policy and its attempts to develop  
labor migration schemes, Ghana is trying to find  
regular pathways for its potential migrants.
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the Mediterranean, Libya’s oil-rich economy continues to 
provide high-reward and attractive work opportunities.39 In 
addition, some Ghanaian youth – both skilled and unskilled 
– continue to see migration as a do or die affair. 
As demonstrated by the government’s push for a labor mi-
gration policy and its attempts to develop labor migration 
schemes, Ghana is trying to find regular pathways for its po-
tential migrants. In 2019, for example, the government aimed 
to send 3,000 trained nurses to Germany through its Work 
Abroad initiative with the intention of replicating it with oth-
er countries. In 2020, 95 nurses were sent to Barbados on 
a two-year contract. These examples of temporary and cir-
cular migration are considered win-win arrangements for 
the countries of destination and of origin as well as for mi-
grants themselves. Furthermore, Ghana sees a double benefit 
in such projects. First, they provide legal and safe pathways 
to migration and, second, they create “ways to repatriate mi-
grants’ pensions and investments to Ghana, which can serve 
as a source of capital investment for the government.”40 
3.3  ECOWAS and the Limits of Regional  
Free Movement in West Africa
As a stable democracy and key economic player in West Af-
rica, Ghana – together with Côte d’Ivoire and Nigeria – at-
tracts most of the immigration from the ECOWAS region.41 
In 2019, Ghana was home to half a million (466,800) mi-
grants who made up 1.5 percent of its total population. Most 
of them are ECOWAS nationals; indeed, 74 percent of all mi-
grants to Ghana come from just four origin countries: Togo, 
Nigeria, Côte d’Ivoire, and Burkina Faso.42 Similarly, close to 
half of all Ghanaian emigrants are found in the same four 
ECOWAS countries: Nigeria, Côte d’Ivoire, Burkina Faso, and 
Togo (see Figure 5).43 Overall, Nigeria remains the primary 
destination of Ghanaian emigrants because of its econom-
ic attractiveness and shared features such as language (En-
glish and Pidgin English).44  
This high level of regional mobility is anchored in ECOWAS 
policies. The ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement of Per-
39  Interview of a Ghanaian returnee from Libya in Techiman on November 8, 2019.
40  Interview of a senior civil servant in Accra on August 30, 2020. 
41   Aderanti Adepoju, “Operationalizing the ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement of Persons: Prospects for Sub-Regional Trade and Development,”  
in The Palgrave Handbook of International Labour Migration: Law and Policy Perspectives, ed. Marion Panizzon et al. (London, 2016), pp. 441–62. 
42  United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, “Total migrant stock at mid-year,” International Migrant Stock 2019, August 2019.
43  Ibid. 
44   The notable rise in emigration at the turn of the 21st century can, in part, be explained by Ghana’s macroeconomic downturn that followed its policies of economic 
adjustement in the 1980s and 1990s.  
45  Republic of Ghana, “Ghana Investment Promotion Centre Act, 2013”:  
https://www.gipcghana.com/press-and-media/downloads/promotional-materials/3-gipc-act-2013-act-865/file.html (accessed March 18, 2021).
46   Maxwell Adombila Akalaare, “Nigerian traders drag Ghana to ECOWAS Court,” Graphic Online, November 18, 2013:  
https://www.graphic.com.gh/business/business-news/nigerian-traders-drag-ghana-to-ecowas-court.html (accessed June 10, 2020).
sons and the Right of Residence and Establishment, which 
were presented in 1979 and ratified by all member states in 
1980, guarantee free entry and a 90-day visa-free period for 
ECOWAS nationals. 
Yet, to this day, the right of establishment – i.e., the right 
of citizens of ECOWAS countries to settle freely in other 
ECOWAS countries – faces resistance. Many member states, 
including Ghana, tend to prefer protectionist policies. The 
2013 Ghana Investment Promotion Centre (GIPC) Act, for 
example, only allows investment of more than $1 million 
from immigrants and prohibits non-Ghanaians from en-
gaging in retail businesses and petty trading in designated 
marketplaces.45 However, many consider the $1 million re-
quirement for investment in Ghana excessive. In 2013, asso-
ciations of Nigerian traders brought Ghana to the ECOWAS 
Community Court of Justice for enforcing the GIPC Act.46 
Anti-immigrant sentiment adds another layer of challeng-
es. There have been repeated clashes and attacks between 
Nigerian and Ghanaian traders as well as forced closures of 
FIG. 5:   GHANAIANS IN OTHER ECOWAS COUNTRIES
Source: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division,  
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Nigerian shops.47 While Nigerian media report the events as 
xenophobic attacks,48 Ghanaian media sometimes consider 
them to be a matter of conflicting legislations.49 The situa-
tion has been a major source of tension in bilateral relations 
between the two countries.
3.4  Irregular Migration: Small Volume, Outsize EU Interest 
The external dimension of the EU’s migration policy has 
brought irregular migration to the forefront of its relation-
ship with third partner countries. This is demonstrated in 
political commitments tied to financial incentives, specifically 
in the Western African region.50 Following funding incentives, 
Ghana has taken on parts of the EU agenda on irregular mi-
47   Emelia Ennin Abbey, “Police arrest nine after GUTA, NUTAG clash,” Graphic Online, December 3, 2019:  
https://www.graphic.com.gh/news/general-news/police-arrest-nine-after-guta-nutag-clash.html (accessed June 11, 2020); “Ghanaian retail traders clash with Nigerian 
counterparts at Circle,” GhanaWeb, July 24, 2020:  
https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/business/Ghanaian-retail-traders-clash-with-Nigerian-counterparts-at-Circle-1015864 (accessed August 20, 2020).  
48    Adamu Abuh, “Reps move to protect Nigerians from xenophobic attacks in Ghana,” The Guardian, December 5, 2019:  
https://guardian.ng/news/reps-move-to-protect-nigerians-from-xenophobic-attacks-in-ghana (accessed, June 12, 2020). 
49  Maxwell Adombila Akalaare, “Nigerian traders drag Ghana to ECOWAS Court” (see note 46).
50  Mainly with the launch of the European Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF) and the subsequent Joint Valletta Action Plan in 2015. 
51 Government of the Netherlands, “Joint Declaration on Ghana-EU Cooperation on Migration” (see note 22). 
52  Interview of a senior civil servant in Accra on August 30, 2020.
53  IOM, “Ghana integrated migration management approach,” January 2016:  
https://www.iom.int/sites/default/files/country/docs/ghana/GIMMA-Information-Sheet-January-2016.pdf (accessed November 23, 2020).  
54  International Center for Migration Policy Development,“Strengthening Border and Migration Management in Ghana (SMMIG)”:  
https://www.icmpd.org/our-work/capacity-building/regions/africa/strengthening-border-and-migration-management-in-ghana-smmig (accessed September 29, 2020). 
To cite a different example, GIZ’s project Employment and Skills for Development in Africa (E4D) aims to create jobs for Ghanaians in Ghana via public-private cooperation 
arrangements in an effort to keep Ghanaians in Ghana. Likewise, the Ghanaian-German Centre for Jobs, Migration, and Reintegration (GGC), which is operated by the GIZ, 
advises Ghanaians on employment and vocational training in Ghana. See: GIZ, “Promoting employment in Africa through public-private co-operation”:  
https://www.giz.de/en/worldwide/31947.html (accessed August 19, 2020).
55   Eurostat Data for EU 28, “Third country nationals found to be illegally present – annual data (rounded),” 2020.
56  Interview of a senior researcher in Accra on June 9, 2020. 
57   IOM, “Ghana Annual Report 2018,” September 2019: https://www.iom.int/sites/default/files/country/docs/ghana/iomghana_annualreport2018.pdf  
(accessed June 9, 2020). 
gration and has been very cooperative on areas such as bor-
der management and institutional capacity building.51 
The EU’s emphasis on irregular migration has, for exam-
ple, come to dominate the NMP.52 The majority of proj-
ects implemented with EU funds to operationalize the NMP 
precisely target migration control. These include: IOM’s 
Ghana Integrated Migration Management Approach (GIM-
MA) project that was launched in 2014;53 a similar project on 
Strengthening Border and Migration Management in Ghana 
(SMMIG) that was launched by ICMPD in 2018;54 and sensi-
tization campaigns on irregular migration that IOM and the 
Ghanaian government continue to organize with the sup-
port of EU funding.
Yet, compared to irregular arrivals from other nations, ir-
regular migration from Ghana to the EU is small in scope 
(see Figure 6). Following a surge from 2015 to 2016, irregu-
lar border crossings have dropped to their pre-2013 levels 
with less than 500 detections in 2019. Similarly, the number 
of Ghanaian nationals in irregular situations in the EU has 
remained stable since 2010, with the majority found in Ger-
many (2,090), the UK (620), and Greece (395).55 The limited 
scope of this phenomenon also partly explains Ghana’s limit-
ed interest in cooperating on forced returns.
Because of the relatively small scope of irregular migration, 
Ghanaian policymakers do not perceive irregular migration as 
a prominent issue for the country – as might be the case in 
neighboring Nigeria.56 Their primary concern regarding irreg-
ular movements relates to issues of the smuggling and traf-
ficking of Ghanaians in Europe, the Middle East, and within 
West Africa. It also focuses on the high prevalence of inter-
nal child trafficking in Ghana, which is linked to child labor 
in fishing, mining, and agriculture.57 Therefore, for Ghana, as 
FIG. 6:  IRREGULAR MIGRATION FROM GHANA TO THE EU
Source: Eurostat Data for EU 28, “Third country nationals found to be illegally present – annual data 
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with the small number of its citizens in the Gulf, the situation 
of its citizens in Europe is primarily a question of duty of care.
3.5 Forced Returns: A Politically Hazardous Area
Despite the increase of EU-funded initiatives on return and 
reintegration, Ghana has shown little interest in cooperat-
ing with the EU on forced returns. The 2016 Joint Declara-
tion mentioned a mutual interest in cooperation on returns, 
but it ultimately only contributed to a slight increase of the 
return rate, i.e., back to pre-2014 levels that had hovered 
around 40 percent (see Figure 7). In 2019, the three Euro-
pean countries that returned the highest number of Gha-
naians – both voluntarily and forcibly – were the UK (365), 
Germany (250), and Netherlands (150).58 To date, no formal 
readmission agreement exists between Ghana and the EU 
or its member states. 
Ghana’s lack of commitment on forced returns from the EU 
is easily explained as it stems from policy priorities and an 
assessment of political risk. Importantly, cooperating on 
forced returns can put the government at odds with its di-
aspora policy. It risks harming diaspora engagement efforts, 
reducing remittances and investments, and potential-
ly pushing unemployment at home. Politically, opposition 
parties can criticize return cooperation with the EU which 
risks undermining the legitimacy of the ruling party.59
58 Eurostat Data for EU 28, “Third country nationals ordered to leave, and third country nationals returned following an order to leave,” 2020. 
59 Interview of a senior civil servant in Accra on August 30, 2020. 
4. RECOMMENDATIONS
The following recommendations cannot close the gap be-
tween the often diverging migration interests of the Gha-
naian and European governments. They can, however, give 
German and European politicians, policy experts, and prac-
titioners concrete and actionable ideas for how to aim for 
more informed migration discussions with their Ghanaian 
counterparts in the future. 
1.  Giving Ownership Means Giving Up Control: To Deliver 
Better Results, Ensure that National Stakeholders Are 
On Board when Overhauling Migration Policy 
Europeans’ good intentions of giving ownership to nation-
al authorities are sometimes at odds with their urge to keep 
oversight and control over European funds. The process 
of developing and implementing Ghana’s National Migra-
tion Policy can serve as a warning of a process that suffered 
from insufficient local ownership. Ghana needs the financial 
and technical support of European donors and internation-
al organizations. But national stakeholders – including non-
state actors such as researchers as well as civil society and 
local actors such as city-level officials – should be at the 
center of policy elaboration and implementation. 
EU-funded projects should, therefore, review their moni-
toring and evaluation processes to ensure the involvement 
and active participation of national stakeholders at every 
step. The practice of developing, implementing, and manag-
ing projects through contracting international or European 
organizations while Ghanaian actors are mere participants 
does not encourage local ownership. 
At worst, such initiatives are considered extended job cre-
ation opportunities for Europeans. At best, they are simply 
not welcomed by Ghanaian actors, reducing their level of 
cooperation and buy-in. If Europeans want to aid migration 
policy development in Ghana or other coutries, they need 
to face the fact that this can only result from ceding some 
control. Otherwise, new initiatives will exist on paper, but 
not change reality. 
2.  Get the Right People to the Table: Today’s Power  
Figures Are Different from Tomorrow’s
Because policies conducted by any government are likely to 
be revised after a change to that government, it is imper-
ative for European partners to involve the two main polit-
FIG. 7:   RETURNS FROM THE EU TO GHANA
Source: Eurostat Data for EU 28, “Third country nationals ordered to leave, 
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ical parties in any future discussions on migration policies 
and debates in Ghana. After President Akufo-Addo’s election 
in 2017, for example, he distanced himself from the recently 
validated NMP and placed the Diaspora Engagement Policy 
under the newly created Diaspora Affairs Office at the Office 
of the President. Following the 2020 presidential and parlia-
mentary elections – and the subsequent challenge of the re-
sults on which the Ghanaian Supreme Court ruled in favor of 
President Akufo-Addo – the government might prioritize the 
NMP and Ghana’s partnership with the EU differently. 
Just as in Europe, party politics can tip the scales of the de-
bate and provoke policy shifts. In the same vein, German 
and European policymakers should be aware that discuss-
ing migration agreements during an election year or right 
after a government change may not be as effective as doing 
it during the earlier part of a legislative period. 
3. Be Clear-Eyed about Inter-Ministerial Tension
Just as in Europe, the field of actors involved in migration 
governance is crowded. Turf disputes are the norm in dem-
ocratic governance, and Ghana is no exception. Europeans 
should, therefore, be familiar with – or at least know of – 
the main actors that play a role in migration policymaking in 
Ghana. They should also have a clear understanding of how 
they are perceived by other actors and of tensions between 
them. Only such understanding can prevent the inadver-
tent worsening of tensions as has happened, for example, 
through the channeling of funds and staffing of identifica-
tion missions (see section 2.1 for details). 
4.  Support Ghana’s Diaspora Engagement  
and Labor Migration Policies
Ghana seeks to attract investments from the diaspora and in-
crease low-cost remittance transfers and ways to repatri-
ate the savings and pensions of Ghanaian migrants abroad. 
Following the launch of its National Labor Migration Policy 
(NLMP), Ghana is looking to secure safe pathways for employ-
ment overseas, especially for unskilled or low skilled laborers. 
European policymakers should seize this opportunity and 
scale up employment-based legal migration – as proposed 
in the EU’s New Pact on Migration and Asylum and in Ger-
many’s Skilled Migration Act – to enable circular and sea-
sonal solutions to migrate. This is crucial as Ghanaian 
60   Dilip Ratha, Supriyo De, Eung Ju Kim, Sonia Plaza, Ganesh Seshan, and Nadege Desiree Yameogo, “Data release: Remittances to low- and middle-income countries  
on track to reach $551 billion in 2019 and $597 billion by 2021,” World Bank Blogs, October 16, 2019:  
https://blogs.worldbank.org/peoplemove/data-release-remittances-low-and-middle-income-countries-track-reach-551-billion-2019 (accesssed January 29, 2020). 
61   “Au Ghana, la prévention de la migration illégale ne fait pas le poids face au chômage” [In Ghana, preventing illegal migration is no match for unemployment], Jeune Afrique, 
June, 3, 2018: https://www.jeuneafrique.com/depeches/565105/politique/au-ghana-la-prevention-contre-la-migration-illegale-ne-fait-pas-le-poids-face-au-chomage 
policymakers are simultaneously looking to attract skilled 
emigrants back home to counter excessive brain drain with 
the Diaspora Engagement Policy. Legal migration opportu-
nities need to be communicated well to target audiences, 
for instance through the Ghanaian-German Centre for Jobs, 
Migration, and Reintegration (GGC) or through the delega-
tions of national Chambers of Commerce in Ghana.  
5.  Incentivize ECOWAS Governments to Reduce  
Protectionist Policies
Because most immigration to and emigration from Ghana 
happens within ECOWAS, regional mobility is an essential 
part of Ghana’s migration dynamics. But free movement as 
aimed for in the ECOWAS Protocol has yet to come into full 
force and effect. Protectionist tendencies remain strong, 
especially in countries with larger economies, like Ghana, 
that receive as much, if not more, migrants as they produce 
in ECOWAS. These governments are wary of the implica-
tions that full migration regimes and immigration policies 
would have on their domestic labor markets. The same con-
cerns over foreign competition hamper regional integra-
tion progress across the continent, as seen with the African 
Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) and the AU’s Conti-
nental Free Movement Protocol.
EU efforts to support regional free movement have done lit-
tle to fight these grievances. Instead, EU and German policy-
makers should provide incentives for ECOWAS governments 
to let go of protectionist policies. Lowering the costs of in-
tra-African remittances may be a good place to start. The 
cost of sending remittances on the continent stands high at 9 
percent and has seen little improvement in recent years de-
spite international commitments.60 With lower transfer fees, 
migrants may have a greater interest in using formal chan-
nels, which would, in turn, ensure that remittances effec-
tively contribute to the fiscus. This could help unlock other 
positive milestones for migrant workers, including simplified 
trade regimes and the right to establishment. 
With close to half of all its emigrants in the ECOWAS region, 
Ghana is likely to support policy changes at the ECOW-
AS level that could result in higher remittances. After his 
election in 2017, President Akufo-Addo had shown a strong 
commitment to securing oportunities for African youths in 
Africa.61 The promise of increased opportunities to migrate 
in the region should be music to his ears.  
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6.  Refrain from Promoting a Narrative of Migration  
Control in ECOWAS
European policymakers take an ambivalent approach to 
ECOWAS. While they support the expansion of regional in-
tegration (see recommendation 4.5), they also continue to 
favor bilateral relations with member states – in particu-
lar, to counter north-bound irregular migration. This du-
al approach may have run against the regional leadership 
of ECOWAS; it certainly provides ground for member states 
to delay the full implementation of regional free movement. 
This leads to skewed migration regimes across the region 
that favor the diaspora and emigration at the expense of im-
migration. It also leaves immigration actors devoid of their 
mandate and competing over other migration issues. This is 
the case in Ghana, where the Ministry of Interior, despite a 
mandate on immigration, has become the front-runner for 
migration policy as a whole. 
Policymakers in Europe can play their part to attenu-
ate these policy imbalances and ministerial frictions. They 
should refrain from promoting a narrative of migration con-
trol in ECOWAS. Instead, they should invite member states 
such as Ghana to push free movement and immigration in 
the region further. This is essential to reaping the benefits 
of regional free movement  and integration in the future.  
(accessed February 20, 2020).
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5.  ANNEX:  
LIST OF INTERVIEWS CONDUCTED
Date Form of Interview Organization/Institution Anonymized Title 
11-8-2019 Interview Ghanaian Returnee from Libya Libya Returnee
6-9-2020 Interview Centre for Migration Studies Senior Researcher
6-15-2020 Background Discussion Former International Agency Worker Expert on Migration Management, Ghana
7-9-2020 Interview Ministry of Employment and Labour Relations Senior Civil Servant
8-12-2020 Background Discussion Independent Researcher Expert on Migration Management, Ghana
8-30-2020 Interview Ministry of Interior (Migration Unit) Senior Civil Servant
8-30-2020 Interview Ministry of Interior (Ghana Immigration Service) Senior Civil Servant
8-30-2020 Interview Independent Researcher Civil Society Activist
8-31-2020 Interview Ministry of Gender Senior Civil Servant
8-31-2020 Interview Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration 
(Diaspora Bureau)
Senior Civil Servant
9-4-2020 Background Discussion Ministry of Interior (Ghana Immigration Service) Senior Civil Servant
1-20-2021 Interview Centre for Migration Studies Senior Researcher
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